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Abstract: The courtroom can be seen as a semiotic space where the practice of signs
is institutionalized. There are specific ways to perform signs in court, be they verbal
(e. g., turn-taking) or nonverbal (e. g., attire). Legal signs communicate and signify
differently than their non-legal counterparts. Laypeople may not be aware of such
differences, and may encounter a gap between their expectation and the actual
practice of legal signs. This is precisely the case for unrepresented litigants, lay-
people who go to court without legal counsel, whose understanding and practice of
signs usually differ from legal ones given their limited exposure to legal knowledge
and culture. This paper examines unrepresented litigants’ lay practice of signs in
Hong Kong courtrooms, and analyses how it clashes with that used by legal profes-
sionals. Our data consist of courtroom observations of 54 Cantonese case manage-
ments and 13 Cantonese trials in district courts in Hong Kong, 10 interviews with
unrepresented litigants and 6 relevant judgments. The paper shows that the differ-
ences in the use of semiotics often place laypeople as out-group members of the law
and may limit their access to justice. Our analysis will contribute to an understand-
ing of laypeople’s behavior in the courtroom, which in turn bridges the communica-
tion gap between laypeople and legal professionals in common law jurisdictions.
Keywords: signs, legal-lay expectations of justice, unrepresented litigants, legal
language, courtroom discourse
1 Introduction
The dyadic model of the sign by Saussure defines a sign as having two components
– a signifier (significant) and a signified (signifié). The former refers to the form that
a sign takes whereas the latter refers to the concept that a sign represents. What
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troubles communication is that the relationship between a signifier and a signified
is largely arbitrary (Saussure 1983 [1916]). As Chandler notes, “signs … have no
intrinsic meaning and [things] become signs only when we invest them with mean-
ing” (Chandler 2002: 13). The meaning of signs is subject to the space in which they
are situated. Courtroom as a semiotic space offers an example of how signs are
institutionalized through specialized usage and may therefore be impenetrable to
an outsider. This is precisely the case for unrepresented litigants, laypeople who are
party to a trial without legal counsel, whose understanding and practice of signs
usually differ from legal ones given their limited exposure to legal knowledge and
culture. This paper examines unrepresented litigants’ lay practice of signs in Hong
Kong courtrooms, and analyses the differences between legal professionals and the
laypeople in their expectation and interpretation of courtroom interactions. Such
differences may limit laypeople’s access to justice and their perception of justice.
Unrepresented litigation is a useful lens through which the specificity of signs
in common law and its challenges to lay-legal communication can be examined.
As Moorehead and Sefton aptly observe,
[b]ecause of the substantive and procedural naivety of unrepresented litigants, the tradi-
tional roles of judge (passive arbiter) and court staff (passive administrator) are chal-
lenged, as are some of the central conceits of an adversarial paradigm. The usual rules
and assumptions governing civil and family procedure do not work, or do not work as well:
unrepresented litigants do not know or understand the prevailing paradigms of court
practice and their behavior is naturally, as a result, at odds with the normal practices of
a court. (Moorhead and Sefton 2005: 265)
Reports from different parts of the world suggest that unrepresented litigants
oftenmake procedural errors (for example, they do not knowhow to properly object
to evidence; see Klein 2010) and do not demonstrate knowledge of substantive law
(for example, they have difficulty determining what evidence is relevant and reli-
able; see Lewis 2007). Unrepresented litigants in Hong Kong have been found to
share the same plight and in particular, they have little idea as to how to compile
documents, when to summon witnesses and what to highlight in their case (Kelly
and Cameron 2003; Kelly 2005; Kelly et al. 2006; Ng 2009). As a result, judges and
the opposing party are sometimes compelled to take over some of such responsi-
bilities to facilitate the trial. Despite the help they get, unrepresented litigants’
unfamiliarity with legal semiotics may continue to place them at a disadvantaged
position. It is important to ask then – how do laypeople deal with legal semiotics
and how do they draw on, if any, lay semiotics to help them understand the law?
Hong Kong is a suitable site for such investigation for two reasons: (1) its
rising number of unrepresented litigants, and (2) its relatively recent bilingual
policy that changed the medium of legal communication. Official statistics shows
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that 35% of civil trials in High Court and 55% of civil trials in District Court
involved at least one party of unrepresented litigants in 2009 (Judiciary
Administration 2010). One potential trigger for the increase in self-representation
is the change of legal language(s) following the handover of Hong Kong in 1997.
As a colonial import from Britain, the common law was mostly conducted in
English during much of the colonial rule (1841–1997). Chinese1 was introduced as
another official language, with an equal status, shortly before the change of
sovereignty. Since the first language for the majority of Hong Kong citizens is
Cantonese Chinese, the policy has the potential to extend their access to justice.
Yet, the lifting of the language barrier does not address all the communication
problems faced by unrepresented litigants. There is a need to look into the nature
of such problems, and the study of semiotics may provide an illustrative angle
into the examination.
2 Differences between legal and lay expectations
of justice
In order to examine the aforementioned questions, data were collected through
courtroom observations and interviews with unrepresented litigants in Hong Kong.
From September 2012 to August 2013, 54 Cantonese case managements and 13
Cantonese trials were observed in district courts; 9 unrepresented litigants were
briefly interviewed and 1 unrepresented litigant was interviewed in detail with
recordings. 6 of the relevant judgments were also obtained for analysis. All of the
cases observed involved at least one unrepresented party and they were all civil
litigations.
Since courtroom transcripts are generally accessible only to parties of a
trial, the data reported below are based on the notes jotted during observa-
tions. The data therefore are not suited for detailed discourse analysis but they
provide a good illustration of how unrepresented litigants interact with various
parties in court, and how a divergence between legal and lay expectations of
the law may be revealed from their contact with the court. The interview data
will provide explanations of their courtroom behavior by revealing how they
approach the law.
1 The written form of Chinese is also known the Standard Chinese, whereas the oral form is
predominantly Cantonese in Hong Kong, a dialect widely spoken in Guangdong province.
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The data indicate that unrepresented litigants’ use of language, manner of
advocacy and ideology of litigation are different from that of legal personnel.
Each of these areas will be elaborated in the following.
2.1 Nonverbal signs
From the moment a person walks into the courtroom, s/he is already expected to
behave according to courtroom etiquette, for example standing and sitting at the
right time and place. These conventions are well-known to legal personnel but are
the mostly unwritten practice of common law (Wilkinson et al. 2007; Clarke 1991).
These conventions may not be intuitive to laypeople who have limited exposure to
the semiotics of the courtroom. Yet, an underlying dilemma is that the law operates
in its own semiotic world that expects its participants to know the rules of the game,
e. g., courtroom etiquette and courtroom procedures. Anyone who does not comply
with the rulesmay undermine the efficiency and fairness of litigations as well as the
respect and dignity for the court (Clarke 1991). In order to avoid such situations,
various jurisdictions such as the United States, Australia, and Canada have realized
the need to provide clear guidance to laypeople and published guidelines on
courtroom etiquette (Magistrates Court of Tasmania, Australia 2014; Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada n.d; United States Bankruptcy
Court Southern District of Illinois n.d).
In Hong Kong, the only visible displays that provide some guidance to
courtroom etiquette can be found on the doors of the courtrooms. On each
door, there are three signs that outline forbidden behaviors, i. e., no eating,
talking, or using mobile phones. Most of the observed unrepresented litigants
seemed to have paid attention to the signs. One unrepresented litigant took a
phone call when it rang loudly in court, and the judge reprimanded him for
disturbing the court and also reminded him of the judge’s power to put him
under arrest. The unrepresented litigant may be unaware that bringing the social
habit of using mobile phones, including a quick response to end a phone call,
into the courtroom may amount to the contempt of court. According to CAP336
District Court Ordinance 48B Contempt of Court,2 a judge has the power to
punish any acts that obstruct the administration of justice. The situation may
2 In Hong Kong, CAP336 District Court Ordinance 48B Contempt of Court states that, a judge
has the powers of a judge of the Court of First Instance to:
(a) punish for disobedience of a judgment or order of the Court; or
(b) punish for breach of undertakings; or
discipline or punish for breach of a duty imposed upon a solicitor by rules of court.
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be worsened by the fact that there is an absence of guidelines on standard
courtroom etiquette, as commonly identified in various jurisdictions before
(Clarke 1991). Hong Kong is no exception. Under such circumstances, it seems
only normal for laypeople to behave differently from professional advocates, but
the question remains – to what extent does the court allow laypeople to deviate
from expected behavior? The two examples below suggest that the court exer-
cises its discretion and tends to be lenient with laypeople’s deviated behavior.
Some common behavior from unrepresented litigants, as observed in
Leung’s (2015) courtroom observation in Hong Kong, include cluelessness as
to when to sit, speak or use body gesture. In one of the trials we observed, a
judge had to remind the unrepresented litigant to: “Stand up when you are
speaking. That is a rule in court.” Judges regard rising as necessary for main-
taining judicial decorum, since it is a “physical gesture of respect for … the
sovereign” (Clarke 1991: 963). Yet, the symbolic meaning behind the gesture
remains obscure to unrepresented litigants. No explanation is offered in the
official reference texts that aim to prepare unrepresented litigants for civil
litigations by the Hong Kong government. It may not be important for unre-
presented litigants to know the symbolic meaning, but such knowledge is the
basis of courtroom conventions that preserve the professionalism and power of
the court (see Clarke 1991).
Another noted example is the act of bowing which is also “a traditional
way of indicating mutual respect” (Magistrates Court of Tasmania, Australia
2014). In common law jurisdictions, it is often expected that one rises and
bows to the judge when he proceeds to the court from the backdoor. This is
usually signaled by three knocks on the door by the judge before his entrance,
and also by the judicial clerk’s announcement of “court.” Although unrepre-
sented litigants generally noticed that they had to stand up in this case, some
litigants that we observed did not foresee the bowing, and after a few seconds’
delay, they usually nodded gently instead. It is relatively easy for laypeople to
observe and follow such practice as it resembles the manner of a social
encounter in which one returns a bow to another as greeting.
Yet, institutionally specific practice is less easy to grasp. For instance, it
has been observed that during litigations, legal personnel all bowed to the
judge in the hallway each time they wished to walk in or out of the courtroom.
This is to attribute reverence to the court, and enhance its public image (see
Clarke 1991). On the other hand, most unrepresented litigants we observed
walked freely between their seats and hallway without any gesture. They
might have presumed that bowing at the beginning of a trial would suffice,
just like how greeting is usually done once and for all at the beginning of a
“You have to teach the judge what to do” 367
Brought to you by | The University of Hong Kong Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/1/18 9:04 AM
social encounter. In either case, it shows that the meaning of everyday
practice of signs is different from the legal practice of signs.
2.2 Lay advocacy strategies
Unrepresented litigants have been found to readily engage in quarrel with the
other party in court, but they may not be ready to present a legal argument when
they are expected to (Leung 2015). Unrepresented litigants’ courtroom behavior is
not just indicative of their advocacy strategy, but also how the court exercises
control over unrepresented litigants.
“Emotional” is a word that most legal personnel would use to describe
Cantonese litigants in court, including unrepresented litigants (Ng 2009: 5).
While professional advocates must keep their emotion in bounds (Boon 1999),
unrepresented litigants seem to use display of emotion as a strategy to convey
their arguments. A rather extreme example to illustrate this from our observa-
tions was the physical act of disagreement. Apart from frequent finger-pointing,
an unrepresented litigant banged a torchlight loudly on the table and then
pointed it at the witness and shouted我照住你 (My light is on you) in the middle
of the other counsel’s cross-examination of the witness. His intention was to
coerce the witness to speak the truth. He may have drawn on popular culture to
help him understand the questioning process in an institutionalized setting. His
act resembled an often portrayed scene in local soap operas where a police
officer shines a bright light at the suspect during interrogation, demanding him/
her to confess. In addition, the use of torch also conjures up the image of a
talisman in Chinese literature and culture called 照妖鏡 (a demon-revealing
mirror). In one of the four major Chinese classics 西遊記 (The Journey to the
West), the true identity of a demon in disguise is revealed in the demon-reveal-
ing mirror or through light reflected from the mirror (see Luo 1987). The unre-
presented litigant may have adopted such symbolic meaning of light in his act.
Yet, neither the act nor its symbolism fit into the semiotics of the common law
courtroom. Instead, it disrupted the flow of litigation, and may even be seen as a
harassment of witness as it may cause emotional distress on the witness (see
Rhines 1995).
More often than not, however, unrepresented litigants’ emotions are chan-
neled through their use of language and tone. Name-calling or accusation (Leung
2015) for instance is commonplace. Phrases such as 大話精 (literally ‘lying mon-
ster,’ roughly equivalent to ‘barefaced liar’), 賴皮 (literally ‘blame the skin,’
referring to shedding responsibility), 大話連篇 (‘series of big lies’), 全無道德責任
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(‘no sense of moral responsibility’), 明顯揑造事實,作出虛假陳述,誣衊本人
(‘obviously fabricated the facts and made false statements to frame me’) were
only a few of the noted examples of how unrepresented litigants added color to
their speech. They might have used these unsubstantiated derogatory or accusative
phrases due to an uncontrollable burst of emotion. Alternatively it may be seen as
a tactical reiteration of their position by immediately rebutting any unfavorable
statements, a social strategy that often takes place in daily arguments. However,
both the content and language of their assertions are at odds with legal conven-
tions. Clarke (1991) reckons that derogatory remarks may not only derail laypeo-
ple’s arguments but also “[distract] the decision-maker’s collection of information,
[disrupt] the flow of the proceedings, and [cause] inefficiency in court proceedings”
(997). This is why professional advocates are taught to never “make … an allega-
tion which is intended only to insult, degrade or annoy the other side, the witness
or any other person” (Sherr 1993: 95). This shows how socially meaningful phrases
seemingly useful in everyday arguments translate into signs that are meaningless,
offensive, and even detrimental to their case when they are re-semioticized or
recontextualized in law.
Sometimes unrepresented litigants also use foul language in court. In one
case, a 70-year-old unrepresented litigant with primary school education
repeatedly used foul words as intensifiers when answering questions by the
lawyer and the judge; an example is given below:
Excerpt 1: the lawyer (L) questioned the unrepresented litigant (U) on a monetary
dispute
Original English
1 L: 朱先生,請問你在 2003 年 6 月 18
日有冇收到原告人比返你 2 萬 5 千
蚊呢?
Mr. Chu, did you receive the twenty
five thousand dollars from the plaintiff
on 18th June, 2003?
U: 你收嗲啦你! You shut your face!
Facing a standard question about facts, the unrepresented litigant unex-
pectedly asked the lawyer to shut up using a rather rude Cantonese colloquial
phrase 收嗲 (line 4). The character 嗲 originally denotes tea (Hutton and
Bolton 2005). In Cantonese culture, there is a saying 口水多過茶(嗲) (‘your
saliva is more than tea’) that describes a person who talks too much when
drinking tea in a Chinese restaurant. The unrepresented litigant may have
wanted to signal to the lawyer that she had already asked too many questions.
In daily argument, such a provocative phrase may intimidate the other party
from further pursuit. Yet, in the court setting, verbal vulgarity is out of place;
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he was also under vow to answer all questions with regard to what he knew, a
legal obligation that he must fulfil as a witness.
Excerpt 2: the judge (J) helped the lawyer ask the unrepresented litigant (U) the
whereabouts of some money
Original English
1 J: 咁你有冇收返啲錢呀？ Did you collect the money back?
U: 收撚左啦 Fucking collected already
J: 咩呀？ What?
U: 收左啦 Collected already
As the questioning process continued, the judge took over from the lawyer
and pressed the unrepresented litigant for a clear answer. However, a Cantonese
obscene term 撚, which refers to the male genital (see Hutton and Bolton 2005:
246), was inserted as an intensifier into the answer. Perhaps surprisingly, the
judge did not criticize his language use in either case. The judge simply
reminded the unrepresented litigant to be more “polite.” Profanity may amount
to contempt of court3 (Wilkinson et al. 2007). But this is all subject to the judge’s
discretion, and the judge’s lenient treatment of the mentioned case suggests that
the judge may adjust his expectation of courtroom behavior from laypeople,
possibly giving consideration to factors such as their age and education.
The use of profanity may further reveal how laypeople understand an
adversarial trial. An adversarial trial in common law denotes two things – (1)
an attitude where two parties are adversarial to each other, and (2) a platform
where two parties compete and convince the court with their respective argu-
ments. An adversarial attitude however does not have to be expressed emotion-
ally; in fact it has been argued that emotion is the least useful element in
litigations because it may leave bad impressions on the fact-finders and bring
negative impacts to the case outcome (see Evans 1993; Wilkinson et al. 2007).
This seems in contrast with the idea of dispute in the social world where an
adversarial attitude often presupposes a quarrel with emotional accusations and
interruptions. Local soap operas have exploited such social meaning of adver-
sariness by dramatizing how legal personnel are hostile to each other, e. g.,
shouting “objection” to interrupt the other party’s speech (see Apple Daily 2012).
3 In Hong Kong, CAP336 District Court Ordinance 48B Contempt of Court states that, a judge
has the powers of a judge of the Court of First Instance to:
(c) punish for disobedience of a judgment or order of the Court; or
(d) punish for breach of undertakings; or
discipline or punish for breach of a duty imposed upon a solicitor by rules of court.
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Such television programs, likely to be a source of the cultural imaginary of the
legal system, might have given laypeople a false impression of how meaning is
negotiated in the courtroom. However, in an actual courtroom, the portrayed
manner may come at a cost. As the judge warned the above unrepresented
litigant,
we are here to reason, not to take it personal on one another. The provoking scenes on TV
are misleading you, teaching you something wrong. Don’t ever learn from them. They are
negative examples. The court is not a place for adversarial attacks. If you keep on scolding
at will, I may rule contempt of court against you.
The judge’s comment neatly highlights how an adversarial trial seems to
embody different senses for laypeople and professional advocates – where the
former centers on the manner of presentation, while the latter on the platform
for competing legal reasoning.
2.3 Lay cross-examination skills
Equally important to advocacy, apart from manner, are the skills in questioning
witnesses and deconstructing the other story. Yet, unrepresented do not usually
make references to exhibits, quote the exact page number of document bundles or
even pose questions to witnesses in cross-examination (Leung 2015). Leung (2015)
suggests how some unrepresented litigants may not appreciate the purpose of
cross-examination. Indeed our data suggest that unrepresented litigants tended to
seize every opportunity to narrate their side of story, not through questioning the
witness but through dominating the discourse. This may reflect underlying confu-
sion of the purposes of legal procedures – particularly between cross-examination
and opening statement. It is questionable whether the institutionalized practice of
language in the courtroom is penetrable to laypeople at all.
Such strategy used by lay litigants may alter the existing courtroom dynamics.
In common law, (cross)examination is characterized by a specific turn order and
type of turn. Minimal pair, namely question and answer pair, is the expected form
of interaction. Atkinson and Drew (1979) call the interaction “the A-B-A-B turn,” as
it is organized in such a way that the (cross)examiner is expected to ask a question
(A) in anticipation of an answer (B) from the witness. The type and order of turn-
taking symbolize the power relationships in court, in that the (cross)examiner is
empowered to control the types of questions (i. e., open or closed questions) to be
posed to the witness, while the witness is obliged to answer. Yet, unrepresented
(cross)examiners’ treatment of turn-taking gives rise to a different interactional
order.
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This can be seen from the following case in which the plaintiff agreed to rent
an apartment for two years to the late owner (Mr. Lee) of the company, but since
Mr. Lee vacated the premise after 8 months without the plaintiff’s consent to
terminate the lease, the plaintiff sued the company, which was the lessee, for
compensation. As Mr. Lee passed away not long after he had left the premise
and he had entrusted the defendant as the shareholder and chairperson of the
board before his death, the defendant had the responsibility to be tried on behalf
of the company.
Excerpt 3: The unrepresented defendant (D) cross-examined the witness (W) by
narrating his own story, until the judge (J) intervened in their interaction.
Original English
1
5
10
D: 我都唔係個租客,啊李先先係。你追
我無用家,我只不過係個股東,同理
間公司都執左啦,我根本唔知咩事。
I was not the tenant – Mr. Lee was.
There is no point of coming after me. I
was just a shareholder (of the com-
pany), and the company has already
folded. I don’t even know what
happened.
W: 點會唔關你事。或者我地睇下個合
約嘅第三條,個度講到明你公司要負
責家嗎！
How could this be none of your busi-
ness. Maybe let us look at the third
clause of the contract. It says that
your company is responsible for it!
D: 咁間公司都執左啦！ The company has already folded!
W: 但係你答我你係咪間公司負責嘅股
東呀？
But tell me if you are the responsible
shareholder of the company?
J: 你係係度比證據,唔係問問題家。 You are here to give evidence, not to
ask question.
The unrepresented defendant (cross-examiner) took the floor to state
his views on the case (line 1–5) instead of posing any question. This gave
room for the witness (also as the plaintiff) to not only give comments, but also
to take control to direct the cross-examiner to read the contract (line 6–9). The
usurpation of power further took place when the cross-examiner again
responded without asking a question, and this allowed the witness to initiate
a turn to question the defendant (cross-examiner; line 11–12) as if she was the
actual cross-examiner. A sketch of the above discourse illustrates how the pre-
allocated roles may sometimes be reversed when unrepresented (cross)exam-
iners left the floor open. It is such alteration of the A-B-A-B turn that
often creates opportunities for parties to engage in quarrels. This also suggests
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that unrepresented litigants may be too focused on their dominant roles as
either plaintiff or defendant that they are unaware of the obligations they have
to take up in other roles during litigations, i. e., cross-examiner or witness.
Some observed unrepresented litigants coped with cross-examination with
different strategies, and the use of hypothetical question is one such example.
Hypothetical question is sometimes used to examine the logical boundaries of
evidence (Boon 1999). It is usually performed on a witness who has no first-hand
information on factual details but his/her opinion may be of help to the case,
i. e., expert witness (Schachner and Quittner 2000). Therefore, hypothetical
questions may be posed to expert witnesses but not to lay witnesses. Some
unrepresented litigants we observed, however, were not aware of this and they
repeatedly asked lay witnesses to comment on their hypothetical scenarios. For
example, in a lease dispute similar to Mr. Lee’s case, the defendant left the
premise two months after signing the one-year lease without compensating the
plaintiff, and he was subsequently sued for the breach of contract. In cross-
examination, the unrepresented plaintiff posed several hypothetical questions to
the defendant: “Suppose you rented the apartment to a person for a year but he
took off after two months, do you think it is fair that …”and “Suppose that you
have a company that rented a place to a person …” In everyday semiotics,
hypothetical scenarios are often created to induce deductive analysis of a
problem. Hypothetical questions may be posed to expert witnesses, so in a
sense lay semiotics is not entirely incompatible with legal semiotics, but lay-
people may be confused as to when certain semiotics may be deployed.
Another strategy used by unrepresented litigants that we frequently
observed is the use of repetitive questioning. Lawyers may use repetition to
emphasize a point by repeating key words and varying sentence structure (City
Law School (London, England) 2010; Boon 1999). On the other hand, unrepre-
sented litigants might not be as skilled in reformulating questions. For
instance, one unrepresented litigant asked the same question four times with-
out any rephrasing, and the judge had to remind him to stop repeating the
question because the witness had already provided the answer. The unrepre-
sented litigant might have hoped to obtain a more favorable answer to his
question through repetitions. Repetitive questioning may be a strategy to
induce a slip of the tongue from the witness so that his/her incoherent account
can be used against the opposition side’s story. Such strategy in daily argu-
ment is often one of the most direct and frequent forms of confrontation that
aims to compel the other side to agree with the proposition. The legal per-
spective however remains doubtful on the effectiveness of repetitive question-
ing. There are some judges who even perceive the relentless pursuit as “rude”
“You have to teach the judge what to do” 373
Brought to you by | The University of Hong Kong Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/1/18 9:04 AM
and “damaging” because it may leave a bad impression on the jury and cause
prejudice to the case (Clarke 1991: 976–977). In order to induce a favorable
answer, professional advocates will approach the witness with different sets of
questions from different directions (Sherr 1993). This comparison suggests
that unrepresented litigants’ semiotic approach to eliciting answers from the
witness may be more direct, whereas professional advocates are more skilled
in guiding the witness or their approach is simply less confrontational in a
sense.
2.4 Laypeople’s legal reasoning
Given their inexperience with legal semiotics, unrepresented litigants can hardly
be expected to know how to make a legal argument and support it with
reference to precedents. It is suggested that the first step to prepare for a case
is to develop a case theory by looking into the relevant law and evidence (Boon
1999; Ross 2005; Sherr 1993). As McElhaney (McElhaney 1987: 48) notes:
The theory of the case is the basic, underlying the idea that explains not only the legal
theory and factual background, but also fits as much as evidence as possible into a
coherent and credible whole. Whether it is simple and unadorned or subtle and sophisti-
cated, the theory of the case is the product of the advocate. It is the basic concept around
which everything else revolves. (McElhaney 1987: 48)
Given the importance of case theory to litigation, one crucial question in our
investigation is how laypeople theorize their case.
In our data, only one unrepresented litigant specifically referred to a legal
principle based on precedent. This was a lease dispute case, in which the
plaintiff after signing a one-year contract refused to move into the premise
because the landlady (defendant) declined to fix the water heater, and the
plaintiff therefore hoped to terminate the lease and retrieve the rent deposit.
The unrepresented plaintiff argued that since the defendant was unreasonable
in refusing to perform the repair, by the doctrine of repudiation (悔約原則) in
Funfair Co Ltd v Wong Lui Wing, the lease should be invalidated. Repudiation
refers to a rejection or refusal to perform a duty of the contract in the future,
which grants the promisee the right to treat it as a breach of contract for lawsuit
(Garner 2009). Perhaps surprising to the plaintiff, the judge rejected outright the
application of the principle to the case and said that the plaintiff’s interpretation
was “incorrect” and “against her own case.” A detailed explanation was given in
court and in the judgment:
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According to the Court of Appeal in Funfair Co Ltd v Wong Lui Wing [2007] 3
HKLR 609, lease is also a kind of contract, and unless stated otherwise in the
contract, the contract cannot be terminated unilaterally by any party. Although
the doctrine of repudiation also applies to contractual lease, there has to be an
acceptance of repudiation by the other party. Since lease is a contract of land,
both parties are entitled to enforce specific performance. Unless the landlady is
wholly unreasonable in enforcing the lease, the landlady has the right to claim
her rent from the tenant.
Since repair service was not included in the lease, the plaintiff had no right
to enforce such a performance.
The unrepresented litigant seemed to only understand part but not all of
what the doctrine is about. Yet, she was convinced by her reading that the
doctrine of repudiation was applicable, because the case partially fulfilled the
conditions of the doctrine. She insisted on her opinion even after the judge’s
explanation. A lay reading of the law may inform the unrepresented litigant
that the doctrine was at least somewhat relevant and therefore applicable, but
the legal semiotics sees it otherwise, as a legal principle is either applicable or
not at all.
2.5 Expectations of judicial roles
Upon encountering unfamiliar legal semiotics, a lot of litigants we observed
turned to the judge for help. In one recorded interview, an unrepresented litigant
shared his observation that
a lot of people, including me at first, would think that if you tell your story to the judge, the
judge would help you, but actually the judge would not. Quite to the opposite, you have to
teach the judge what to do. If you pay attention and go to a few more trials, you will know
that lawyers would usually say, I’m quoting this ordinance and please rule the case … The
judge would not go to search for ordinance for you and decide whether you win or lose.
This is a misconception harbored by many people.
According to the sporting theory, the common law is an adversarial
game in which judges serve as an umpire, playing a passive rather than
proactive role in litigations (Wilkinson 2000). It is the duties of both parties
to convince the judge with their respective legal arguments by collecting and
presenting relevant evidence in designated procedures. This contrasts with
what laypeople may expect – that judges would be more inquisitorial and
investigative.
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One expectation unrepresented litigants may have towards judges is that
procedural guidance will be given. Judges do indeed spend time – somewhere
between 20 to 40 minutes in trials we observed – to explain legal procedures at
the beginning of a trial, as if they were legal educators. The “lecture” usually
includes the components and flow of litigation, the contrastive functions of
procedures (e. g., opening statement and testifying) and some basic advocacy
skills (e. g., asking questions one by one). However, the instructions do not
seem to be very effective in that most unrepresented litigants still required
constant help from the judge on what to do. Reminders are especially needed
when it comes to the manner of interaction. In order to get his message across,
one judge we observed used metaphors from the social world: “The court is not
City Forum (城市論壇), wet market (街市), or one-voice room (一言堂).” City
Forum is a public forum where public figures and citizens gather to discuss
current issues in Hong Kong, but the frequent interruptions and shouting from
divergent parties dub the forum as chaotic and noisy. Such descriptions apply
even to a greater extent to wet markets where vendors talk in their loudest
voice to sell food and customers squeeze into the crowd to bargain for a good
price. As for one-voice room, it was originally a sign put up by old stores to
forbid negotiation but now it signifies the lack of democracy in which a place
is ruled by the voice of one man alone (Luo 1987). The respective emblems of
the three places as disorderly, clamorous and dominating can be seen as
resources which the judge exploited to set comparisons with the orderliness
and solemnity the court deserves.
Legal advice is also sometimes expected from judges. Judges may offer
advice when unrepresented litigants do not know the merits of their case
(Cameron et al. 2006). Our data further suggest that legal advice also appears
necessary when unrepresented litigants struggle to weigh their potential
options in hand. In the following case, the unrepresented plaintiff was not
satisfied with the service provided by a yacht club, and he protested against it
by refusing to pay the membership fee. The yacht club calculated the owed
membership fee using compound interests, and also terminated his member-
ship. The unrepresented plaintiff sued the yacht club for taking such actions,
and demanded the reinstatement of his membership and a re-calculation of
the debt using simple interests. At the beginning of the trial, the opposing
counsel offered a settlement that not only covered but exceeded the expecta-
tion of his claims, which included the reinstatement of his membership,
a calculation of the debt without any interest, and a waiver of the counsel’s
fees.
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Excerpt 5: The unrepresented plaintiff (P) discussed with the judge (J) about his
claims in relation to the settlement
Original English
1 P: 咁初期我個 claim, 佢地比左個
counter-claim, 但我都再比左個
counter-counter-claim. 咁我可
唔可以追討我係冇左個會藉個
When I first filed the claim, they filed a
counter-claim, but after that I also filed
a counter-counter-claim. Can I ask for
compensation for the period I lost the
5 陣時嘅損失? membership?
J: Counter-claim 係對個 original
claim 左作出嘅,你係唔可以加
碼家嗎。我唔應該講的都要
講。法庭係講啲量化嘅野。你
Counter-claim is made based on the
original claim and you can’t increase
the amount (of compensation you
seek). I shouldn’t say what I’m about to
say. The court talks about
15 想追個啲野可以量化到嗎？如
果唔得,法庭會比個象徵式嘅費
用 100 蚊,以前比 1 蚊。對方已
經唔收訟費。其實,係你唔啱,你
用唔交會費來你投訴,係法律嘅
things that can be quantified. Can you
quantify the stuff you are after? If you
can’t, the court will award you a nom-
inal cost of one hundred dollars. It
used to be only one dollar. They
already waived the litigation
20 角度係你唔啱 … 律師費其實係
三十幾萬。或者你唔會介意,但
係咁好嘅條件。我地不如休庭,
你地傾一傾?
fee. Actually, from the legal point of
view, it is your fault that you com-
plained about the club by refusing to
pay the membership fee … The coun-
sels’ fee would amount to more than
three hundred thousand dollars. Maybe
you don’t care, but the offer is really
good. Why don’t we adjourn the court
for you two parties to talk about it?
25 P: 咁如果我唔同意呢? What if I disagree?
J: 我係納稅人比錢的,公帑話唔需
要進行呢個審訊,但我唔鐘意
「霸王硬上弓」。
I’m paid by tax payers and the pubic
fund says that this litigation is not
necessary, but I wouldn’t prefer to
force a decision upon you.
In addition to offering procedural advice, the judge proceeded to evaluating
the settlement offer for the litigant. The judge’s behavior may have deviated
from the expected passive role of common law judges, and also from the
impression that judges rarely lecture defendants in court (Mileski 1970–1971).
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However, the departure was arguably essential for the unrepresented litigant to
understand the (de-)merits of the case so as to expedite the litigation. It may
help clarify laypeople’s understanding of the law by outlining how a case
proceeds within its semiotic legal framework.
Last but not least, since unrepresented litigants have difficulties in formu-
lating questions in cross-examination, they sometimes expect judges to relay the
message to the other party on their behalf. This sometimes transforms the judge
to be a messenger and an interviewer. Instead of the dyadic cross-examiner-and-
witness pair, there is an emerging triangulated interaction between judge, cross-
examiner and witness where the judge helps reformulate the questions (Leung
2015). This can be seen from the mentioned case about the provision of repair
service to the lessee (see laypeople’s legal reasoning). The unrepresented plain-
tiff argued earlier on that the unrepresented defendant never provided any shoe
cabinet nor repair service. In the following, the unrepresented defendant tried to
counter argue such a claim.
Excerpt 6: The unrepresented defendant (D) cross-examined the witness (W) with
the help of the judge (J)
Original English
1
5
D: 我個櫃呢一早已經係
度。
My shoe cabinet has always been there.
J: 你同意成唔同意個鞋櫃
已經係度？
((turned to the witness)) Do you agree that the
shoe cabinet has always been there?
W: 個陣我冇仔細咁睇。 I didn’t pay attention to it then.
J: 咁你即係同唔同意個鞋
櫃已經係度？
So do you agree or not agree that the shoe cabi-
net has always been there?
W: 唔同意。 No.
As shown, the unrepresented defendant simply made a statement about the
shoe cabinet instead of asking the witness about it (line 1), so the judge assisted
by relaying the message to the witness in a question form (line 2–3). In parti-
cular, the judge repragmatized the statement into a polar question that would
produce readily digestible facts. When the witness’s answer did not conform to
the question type (line 4), the judge restated the question to signal that the
answer can only be either positive or negative. The unrepresented defendant
may not have been aware of her duty as a cross-examiner and expected the
judge to fulfil all the procedural requirements as she narrated her story (line 1).
Narration may be unrepresented litigants’ strategy to reinstate their position,
and such emphasis on narratives shows how they often see their own words as
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self-sufficient evidence (i. e., declaring statements). This is in contrast with how
professional advocates evaluate evidence – they focus on oral testimonies from
third parties for objective evidence (i. e., asking questions). Since the common
law credits the latter rather than the former approach, unrepresented litigants
will be disadvantaged to a certain extent by their way of presenting and
evaluating evidence. For the sake of justice, judges thus sometimes take over
their position as a cross-examiner. Yet, if this takes place too often, judges may
deviate from the presumed passive role too far, which may undermine the
judicial impartiality.
3 Conclusion
The above analyses have illustrated the potential semiotic differences in the treat-
ment of the law between laypeople and professional advocates. Laypeople seem to
draw on lay semiotics from everyday life to help them understand legal semiotics,
but sometimes the attempt to reconcile the differences between the two semiotic
systems may not be successful.
This study has highlighted courtroom decorum and interactional practices
that unrepresented litigants seem to have difficulty with in Hong Kong court-
rooms. Such difficulty may be attributable to unwritten rules of the common law
tradition (Clarke 1991). Overseas experiences from American, Australia and
Canada suggest that an explicit guideline is needed so that legal semiotics can
be properly propagated to laypeople coming into contact with law (Magistrates
Court of Tasmania, Australia 2014; Provincial Court of Newfoundland and
Labrador, Canada n.d; United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of
Illinois n.d). It may therefore be beneficial for the Hong Kong judiciary to
tailor-make its guideline that corresponds to the legal culture in Hong Kong,
so that laypeople can deal with legal signs better on their own.
Introducing unrepresented litigants to the basicmanners of litigation is only one
step towards facilitating their access to the legal system, and what needs to be done
further is to map the ideological gap laypeople seem to have towards the law – that
justice is largely based on the narration of truth with the help of judges. Their vision
of justice leads them to underestimate the importance of procedures andmethods of
argumentation in the common law courtroom. Without understanding how narra-
tives are practiced and evidence are presented in the courtroom, unrepresented
litigants may be severely disadvantaged. An early introduction to the legal semiotics
of these areas may assist lay litigants’ case preparation.
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It is true that the suggestions may address only some of the problems
unrepresented litigants encounter in court. A major issue lies in their unfamiliarity
with legal semiotics in substantive law and advocacy. As Ross (Ross 2005: 5)
recognizes, “there is no quick way to learn the skills of advocacy” – it takes years
of training on the job. The dilemma is that unrepresented litigant’s contact with
law is usually brief, so immersing them in law for a long period of time seems
rather impractical. Future research can look into the extent to which unrepre-
sented litigants should know and learn about the law in order for their advocacy
to be effective.
Theproblemwith unrepresented litigation is asmuchabout languageandpower
as it is about wider social structures and ideologies, e. g., the availability of legal aid,
cultural imaginary of the courtroom, and image of lawyers. It is our hope that the
paperhas (1) revealed thepotential gapbetween legal and lay expectations of the law
by highlighting the tensions between different practices of signs, and (2) shown how
the use of semiotics can advance the socio-legal understanding of the communica-
tion gaps between laypeople and the law.
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